Abstract. We consider a decentralized setting in which agents exchange data along with usage policies. Agents may violate the intended usage policies, although later on auditing authorities may verify the agents' data accountability with respect to the intended policies. Using timestamping and signature schemes, we design and analyze an efficient cryptographic protocol generating communication evidences which enable auditing authorities to validate the agents' behaviour.
Introduction
In many situations, there is a need to share data between potentially untrusted parties while ensuring the data is used according to given policies. For example, Alice may be interested in sending her e-mail address to Bob, but also attaching a non-disclosure policy, so that Bob may not disclose Alice's email to anyone else (see Figure 1 (1)).
Of course, a priori nothing guarantees that Bob will actually follow the policy, making the enforcement of such policies a difficult problem. Access and usage control [JSSB97,SS94,PS02,BCFP03] are exemplary enforcement mechanisms. In these approaches, a trusted access control service arbitrates data access at the moment the request happens, something that can be sometimes overly restrictive and expensive.
Recently, a more flexible approach has been proposed [CEdH + 04,CCD + 05]. In this approach, after Bob receives Alice's e-mail address, Bob is free to violate the policy, for instance by sending Alice's e-mail to Charlie and including a "free-to-be-spammed" policy (see Figure 1 (2). However, it could happen that later on Bob is audited by an authority that requests a convincing proof of Bob's permission to disclose Alice's e-mail address. Auditing authorities are not fixed and pre-established; they may be formed dynamically by (groups of) agents that observe actions in the system. For example, consider that Alice starts getting tons of spam from Charlie (see Figure 1(3) ). Alice may switch to "auditing authority" mode, and enquiry Charlie for a proof of permission to use Alice's e-mail address. A convincing proof exonerating Charlie would be evidence of the communication with Bob which happened before the spam, in which Charlie got Alice's e-mail address along with a "free-to-be-spammed" policy. Upon seeing this, Alice can go to Bob and request a convincing proof he was allowed to Following [CEdH + 04,CCD + 05], we allow the target system to be decentralized, and it may very well be the case that Alice, Bob and Charlie are registered in different domains, which are not even synchronized in their local clocks; even worse, each domain's clock may not even be keeping real time, but may be simply a logical clock (e.g. a counter). Still, an auditing authority would need to recognize events (e.g. communications) that happened before others. For example, the fact that Charlie sent spam to Alice only after having received the permission from Bob exonerates Charlie. Also, an auditing authority needs to be able to recognize valid communication evidence from fake ones; for example, Bob must not be able to repudiate the communication with Charlie. Contributions The works of [CEdH + 04,CCD + 05] focus on designing a highlevel formal proof system to build authorization permissions starting from the atomic communication evidences, which are abstracted away and assumed to be sound (this is analogous to Dolev-Yao models [DY83, CES06] which assume "perfect encryption" in the analysis of security protocols). However, from the above discussion it is clear that it is not trivial to design an effective and secure cryptographic protocol to achieve valid communication evidences to let auditing authorities do their work, as we are in a decentralized setting in which different agents may collude in order to fool the auditing authorities.
In this paper, we design such a cryptographic protocol, which allows agents to exchange usage policies among them in such a way that valid communication evidence is generated after the exchange. Our protocol is efficient, and it's based on standard cryptographic building blocks, as detailed next. Building blocks We use two building blocks in our protocol: time-stamping and signature schemes. We choose to model different agents' domains running different local clocks, which may be logical, as described above. Our model is quite flexible, and in particular brings the following advantages:
-First, we allow the protocol to work in decentralized environments, in which clocks domains do not need to interact between them; -Second, it is possible to use both digital-based and hash-based time-stamping schemes (see [ABSW01] for an overview), the choice depending on the use the implementor has in mind. For instance, if the implementor prefers to regard the time-stamping servers as non-trusted, auditable time-stamping schemes can be used without loss of security. Time-stamping is used to order the events within the domain, and enables our cryptographic protocol to safely logs the different domains' times of the sender and the receiver into the communication evidence. At a later stage, the auditing authority can use this information for the auditing procedure. Signatures by the agents are used to provide integrity, authentication and non-repudiability to the communication evidences.
Plan of the paper We introduce preliminaries and define the security requirements of the protocol in Section 2. The building blocks of the protocol (i.e. time-stamping services and signature schemes) are introduced in Section 3. We present the protocol in Section 4, along with an (informal) security analysis in Section 5. Finally Section 6 concludes the paper.
The setting
Potentially untrusted agents a, b, c ∈ G are sharing data objects d ∈ D which must be used according to policies φ ∈ Φ. The agents are not enforced to comply with the policies, but they can be audited at any time by an Auditing Authority AA, which will check if they were allowed to perform a certain action on a given piece of data d at a certain moment in time. How an agent c shows accountability for possessing or using a certain piece of data depends on the following. If the agent c is the owner of the data, he is allowed to perform any action on the data; otherwise, the agent must show that another agent b sent him a policy φ containing permissions to execute the actions under investigation. Eventually, the AA could iterate the process starting from agent b, and ideally the sequence should led to the owner of the piece of data.
We do not study how to build evidences for the creation of data. For the purpose of this paper, certifying that an agent owns/creates a piece of data needs the interaction with several organizations external to the system, since it involves legal and societal aspects (as an example, an organization issuing patents). Therefore, we assume there exists a public function
( 1) stating to whom the data belongs. In our setting, comm(t 1 , t 2 , a ⇒ b, φ) provides a proof that a string φ was sent from a to b with respect to some local logical time values t 1 , t 2 , where t 1 refers to the sender local time and t 2 refers to the receiver local time. The properties that such a proof should satisfy are as follows:
Meaningfulness. comm(t 3 , t 4 , b ⇒ c, φ ) provides a proof that a string φ has been communicated from b to c.
The reason for this property is trivial. We want to be sure that a communication evidence between Bob and Charlie can only be generated if Bob has communicated φ to Charlie.
Unforgeability. It is not feasible to create an evidence comm(t 1 , t 2 , a ⇒ b, φ) when the local logical clock for b is t 2 > t 2 .
Assume the auditing authority contacts Bob at Bob's logical time t 2 and asks him for a permission for having sent Alice's e-mail address to Charlie. The unforgeability property implies Bob can not provide an exonerating evidence even in the unlikely case he colludes with Alice, since exoneration would require an evidence of the form comm(t 1 , t 2 , a ⇒ b, spread Alice's e-address) to be created at time t 2 with t 2 < t 2 .
Liability. A valid comm(t 3 , t 4 , b ⇒ c, φ ) implies b has committed itself at a logical time t 3 to send φ to c.
That is, if Charlie shows an evidence comm(t 3 , t 4 , b ⇒ c, φ ) showing that Bob sent him a permission to spam Alice at Bob's logical time t 3 , then Bob is liable for showing he had permission to communicate this policy before time t 3 .
Comparability. Any pair of communication evidences comm(t 1 , t 2 , a ⇒ b, φ) and comm(t 3 , t 4 , a ⇒ b, φ ), with a, b, c agents, should be comparable with respect to b's local time, i.e. communication evidences with origin or destination b are totally ordered with respect to b's local logical time.
With this property, we ensure Bob can not show an evidence allowing him to execute a certain action, such that the order of action's permission reception and action/s execution is undetermined.
Building blocks

Time-stamping schemes
Time-stamping is an important data integrity protection mechanism the main objective of which is to prove that electronic records existed at a certain time. Two major time-stamping protocols, the absolute (hash-and-sign) time stamps protocol and the linking protocol have been developed. In the former a timestamping authority (TSA) signs the concatenation of the hashed message and the present time by using its private key. Therefore the TSA is completely trusted in this case.
In the linking protocol, a time-stamp token is the hash value of the concatenation of the present hashed message and the previous hash value. A verifier can check the validity of the token by using published values for the hash chain. In this case, the TSA is not necessarily trusted, and auditing techniques can be used to detect if the TSA eventually cheated. We stress this audit does not need to be performed by our auditing authority; it is sufficient the AA trusts the specific time-stamping auditors.
Time-stamping schemes have been used in business applications and are even included in international standards [ISO] . The major schemes in use are [sur,aut,dig].
The formal security notions for time-stamping schemes are still a subject under discussion. In the following, we quote the syntax and security properties of a time-stamping scheme from [BLSW05] . Notice that the definitions below are abstracted away, so that the different implementations discussed in the literature can be plugged into our protocol. Additionally, an audit functionality can be added to time-stamping schemes with the syntax above. This auditing functionality is used when the TSA is not unconditionally trusted, and it allows to check that the TSA is behaving as expected.
Definition 1 A time-stamping scheme TS is capable of: (1) assigning a timevalue t ∈ N to each request x ∈ {0, 1} k , and (2) verifying whether x was timestamped during the t-th (maybe logical) time unit). It consists of the following components:
Repository -a write only database that receives k-bits digests and adds them to a list D. Repository also receives queries t ∈ N and returns D[t] if t ≤ |D|. Otherwise, Repository returns reject. Stamper -operates in discrete time variables called rounds. During a t-th round, Stamper receives requests x and returns pairs (x, t). Let L t be the list of all requests received during the t-th round. In the end of the round, A time-stamping scheme TS = (Stamp, Publish, Verify) must satisfy the following correctness property:
Security requirements
In the rest of the paper, an adversary is meant to be any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. It is assumed that adversaries A is able to corrupt Stamper, some instances of Client and Verifier. The Repository is assumed to be non-corrupting. After publishing d t it should be impossible to add a new request x to L t and prove to a Verifier that x ∈ L t by building up a certificate c. The following security conditions must be then required:
Definition 2 (Consistency) A time-stamping scheme is consistent if for ev-
With the security notion below, we want that an adversary A can not perform the following attack: A publishes a value d which is not computed by using the Publish function and then, after obtaining a new randomly generated string x, finds a certificate that Verify(x, c, d) = yes.
Definition 3 (Security against random back-dating) A time-stamping scheme is secure against random back-dating if for every polynomially unpredictable distribution D on {0, 1} k and (A 1 , A 2 ) probabilistic polynomial time algorithms
3.2 Signature scheme Definition 1. A signature scheme Σ = (KeyGen, Sign, VerSign) consists of three probabilistic polynomial time algorithms:
-KeyGen takes as input a security parameter 1 k , and outputs a pair (vk, sk), where sk is the secret key of the user, and vk is the matching verification key.
-Sign takes as input a message m and the secret key sk, and produces a signature σ. -VerSign finally, the verification algorithm takes as input a message m, a signature σ and the verification key vk, and returns true if σ is a valid signature of m, and false otherwise.
A signature scheme enjoys the correctness property if it satisfies the following condition: if KeyGen(1 k ) = (sk, vk) and Sign(m, sk) = σ, then VerSign(m, σ, vk) = true. In this case, we say that (m, σ) is a valid message-signature pair.
The standard security notion for signature schemes was introduced in [GMR88] and it is called existential unforgeability against chosen-message attacks. A signature scheme Σ = (KeyGen, Sign, VerSign) is called secure in the latter sense if the success probability of any PPT adversary A in the following game is negligible in the security parameter 1 k :
1. KeyGen(1 k ) outputs (vk, sk) and the adversary is given 1 k and vk. 2. A(1 k , vk) has access to a signing oracle Sign(sk, ·), which on input a message m outputs its signature σ(m). 3. A succeeds if it outputs a valid signature on a message not submitted to the signing oracle.
A communication evidence protocol
Our goal is to design a decentralized protocol performing as less on-line operations as possible. Our system includes certification authorities CA trusted by the auditing authority, which will be used for keys authenticity and non-repudiation purposes. The AA can choose to trust/distrust the time-stamping servers. This election will determine which time-stamping schemes are accepted in the system (cf. the discussion in Section 3.1). The AA is an algorithm taking inputs from the agents, but it does not need itself to be in possession of any special input like a public key or similar. Let us assume the existence of a set of time-stamping and certification authorities satisfying the trust requirements imposed by the AA, as well as the existence of a public board in which each user is inscribed in an unique TSA and CA. Let us denote by TSA a , CA a and TSA b , CA b the authorities in which a and b are respectively registered. A time-stamping scheme is used to provide temporal evidence to bit strings. In our setting consists each time stamping authority TSA a runs a local time variable. We say that T a is the local time managed by TSA a . Despite the local time variables are run in a decentralized manner, we are still able to define an irreflexive partial ordering (denoted by ≺) between events in the different T a 's. Notice that every local time variable has a total order <, i.e. the natural ordering in the set N.
The partial order is defined in terms of the relation 'D 1 existed before D 2 ', where D 1 , D 2 are strings. The relation is determined via time-stamps: a valid time-stamp certificate c a issued on round t a by TSA a on a string m, implies m existed before round t a was closed. As a consequence, a time-stamp c b issued on round t b by TSA b on a string m such that c a is a substring of m , implies that c a existed before round t b was closed. Summing up, the t a -th round in TSA a ended before the t b -th round in TSA b did so. This enables to establish the partial order t a ≺ t b . Any agent a in the system has a unique pair of matching verification/signature keys (vk a , sk a ) corresponding to a secure signature scheme Σ a , and it is registered in a single TSA. We will refer to this as a is registered in TSA a . We assume that these keys are revocable. Therefore, agents have access to certification authorities CA which ensure the verification key vk a belongs to a and provide revocation mechanisms. 
Protocol specification
In order to be able to prevent non-repudiation of communication evidences, we need to slightly modify the revocation mechanism used by the certification authority. In particular, the certification authorities must ask the TSA in which the user is registered to time-stamp the revocation information for that user's public key. In this way, it is possible to check if a a communication evidence was created before either the sender's verification key vk a or the receiver's verification key vk b were revoked.
-Create(a, b, φ):
1. a signs the concatenated string (φ, b) using the scheme Σ a and the signing key sk a . Let σ 1 denote the signature thus obtained. 2. a sends σ 1 to Stamper a , and gets back a valid stamp (t 
Security analysis
Meaningfulness. "A string φ has been communicated from a to b" Firstly, if the communication evidence is verified in the positive, neither a's or b's verification keys were revoked beforehand. That a is the origin of the communication and b is the receiver, is guaranteed by two facts: on the one hand, a valid signature on the message (φ, b) can only be produced by a as long as we are using an unforgeable signature scheme Σ a ; on the other hand, only b is able to compute the signature σ 2 for a similar reason, and he can do that only after a sends ev1 to him.
Unforgeability. "It is not feasible to create an evidence comm(t Liability. "a commits itself to send φ to b at logical time t 1 " a commits to message (φ, b) as soon as he signs it; a valid time-stamp (t a 1 , c a 1 ) on σ 1 implies (φ, b) was signed before the local time counter at TSA a was set to t a 1 . Therefore, a expresses at time t a 1 his willingness to transfer φ to b if he follows the protocol. Finally, if the communication evidence is verified in the positive, a's verification key was not revoked beforehand.
Comparability. "communication evidences with origin or destination a are totally ordered with respect to a's local logical time" This is guaranteed by the fact that a's logical time is T a and that T a has a total order by definition.
Conclusions
We define a cryptographic protocol to provide valid communication evidences, that can be used later by auditing authorities. Even though our protocol is aimed towards guaranteeing data accountability in the settings of [CEdH + 04,CCD + 05], we believe that our protocol can be easily adapted to provide secure transport of arbitrary payloads in decentralized settings, where exchanges need to be logged with communication evidences recording the relative domain times in which the exchanges took place.
